Lain (antropölogo, filösofo e historiador de la medicina) define como relaciön amistosa una serie de actividades que en esencia son: desear el bien del amigo por el amigo mismo, igualdad entre los amigos, comunalidad y comunicaciön entre los amigos y consideraciön de una relaciön entre personas. De la misma forma establece que una vez producido el encuentro, para que exista la amistad, deben cumplirse una serie de reglas, tales como el respeto, la liberalidad, la franqueza, la imaginaciön y el discernimiento (...) afectivo. Entre las patologias de la amistad se encuentran: la consideraciön del otro como objeto, alteraciones derivadas de la relaciön (estatus o niveles sociales), alteraciones entre los fines, los grados de amistad y de las propiedades de la relaciön amistosa, y que habitualmente se manifiestan como alteraciones en el respeto, la igualdad, la confidencia y la convivencia. Las alteraciones producidas en la relaciön amistosa pueden superarse si existe respeto, igualdad, franqueza, consideraciön de ambos como personas, liberalidad,... Todos los fenömenos que se han presentado en esta comunicaciön tienen como caracteristicas la alteraciön de alguna de estas reglas de mantenimiento de la amistad. (shrink)

Se me pide, de parte de mi compañero y amigo de la Academia, Dr José M" Castán Vázquez, que elabore un pequeño trabajo para la revista «Arbor» —a cuyas líneas tuve vedado el acceso por muchos años; mientras duró aquella ordenación y aquella Nomenklatura al frente del CSIC— ; por su director actual. Prof. Dr. PEDRO GARCÍA BARRENO, al que trato casi constantemente-, Y sobre el Tribunal de las Aguas de Valencia, organismo jurídico jurisdiccional —pese a incluso enfurecidos adversarios— (...) único, y admirado por todo el mundo, menos por quienes aspiran a transformar una de las huertas españolas mejor cuidadas, en una selva de hormigón. Ahí van esas líneas, resumen de un libro que, a pie de obra, me costó más de 25 años de elaboración allá en Valencia, y sin ayuda práctica de nadie sino del referido Tribunal. Desafío a que las críticas que se me hagan, se funden en observaciones directas; y no enlatadas en «ordenadores» del terreno y de sus habitantes. No admito «realidades visuales», que no son sino ficciones inmerecidamente decoradas con ese equívoco nombre, lo que ya está dando sus frutos. (shrink)

Las naciones y pueblos indígenas presentan preocupantes índices respecto a la salud, así como otras carencias como la pérdida de sus tierras, la alimentación, la educación y, en general, el ejercicio de sus derechos, consagrados por organizaciones internacionales como la ONU y la OMS-OPS. En Ecuador, de acuerdo con el orden jurídico constitucional, se han instrumentado políticas de salud que incluyen el lineamiento general de un enfoque intercultural de la atenciónprimaria que incorpora los saberes y prácticas ancestrales. Mediante una revisión (...) documental se examina la situación actual de la salud y la atención primaria entre las etnias indígenas del Ecuador. De este análisis se desprenden consideraciones para las políticas públicas de salud, la formación intercultural de los profesionales de los equipos de salud y, en especial, la articulación de las creencias, saberes y prácticas de la cultura de las etnias para la atención primaria de salud. Palabras Clave: Etnia, nacionalidad indígena, pueblo indígena, derecho a la salud, atención primaria. Referencias [1]Asamblea General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, «Resolución 48/134 de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de los pueblos y naciones indígenas,» de Asamblea General Resolución 48/134, New York, 2009. [2]Organización Panamericana de la Salud, «Derechos Humanos y Salud de los pueblos indígenas,» Organización Panamericana de la Salud, New York, 2008. [3]Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas. Manual para las instituciones nacionales de Derechos Humanos, Nueva York: Alto Comisionado de los Derechos Humanos de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, 2013. [4]C. Torres Parodi y M. Bolis, «Evolución del concepto etnia/raza y su impacto en la formulación de políticas públicas para la equidad,» Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública, vol. 22, nº 3, pp. 405-414, 2007. [5]IIDH-OPS, «Salud indígena y derechos humanos,» OPS, Quito, 2006. [6]Organización Panamericana de la Salud, «Iniciativa de la Salud para los Pueblos Indígenas. Lineamientos estratégicos. Plan de acción 2003-2007,» Organización Mundial de la Salud, Quito, 2003. [7]Consejo Mundial de las Iglesias, «Segunda Asamblea Mundial de la Salud de los Pueblos,» Consejo Mundial de las Iglesias, Quito, 2005. [8]Grupo Internacional de Trabajo sobre asuntos indígenas, Instituto de Promoción de Estudios Sociales, Fundación Diversidad, «El Derecho a la Salud de los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento y en contacto inicial,» Grupo Internacional de Trabajo sobre Asuntos Indígenas, Quito, 2007. [9]Organización Panamericana de la Salud, «Salud de los pueblos indígenas de las Américas,» OPS, Quito, 1998. [10]Organización Inernacional del Trabajo, «Convenio número 169 de la OIT. sobre pueblos indígenas y tribales: hacia un futuro inclusivo, sostenible y justo.,» OIT, New York, 2019. [11]L. Almeida Vera, «Fundamentación del modelo de gestión intercultural ecuatoriana en la atención primaria desalud,» Medisam, vol. 8, nº 18, pp. 46-61, 2014. [12]Organización Internacional del Trabajo, «Implementación del Convenio núm 169 de la OIT sobre los pueblos indígenas y tribales: Hacia un futuro inclusivo, sostenible y justo,» OIT, New York, 2019. [13]C. Eysaguirre, Proceso de incorporación de la medicina tradicional, alternativa y complementaria en las prácticas oficiales de la salud. Tesis Magister Antropología, Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2016. [14]Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación, «Sobre la salud y la seguridad de los pueblos indígenas en riesgo debido al coronavirus,» FAO, New York, 2020. [15]Enlace Continental de Mujeres Indígenas de las Américas, Alianza de Mujeres Indígenas de Centroamérica y México, Red de Mujeres Indígenas Asiáticas, Organización de Mujeres Indígenas Africanas, «Llamado colectivo de las mujeres indógenas ante el COVID 19. Foro Internacional de Mujeres Indígenas,» ONU, New York, 2020. [16]Laboratorio de interculturalidad FLACSO Ecuador, Etnohistoria de los pueblos y nacionalidades originarias del Ecuador, Quito: FLACSO Ecuador, 2015. [17]UNICEF, Nacionalidades y pueblos indígenas. Políticas interculturales en Ecuador, Quito: UNICEF, 2009. [18]República del Ecuador, «Constitución de la República del Ecuador,» de 2008, Quito, 2008. [19]S. Ramírez Hita, «Políticas de salud basadas en el concepto de multiculturalidad: los centros de salud intercultural en el altiplano boliviano,» Avá Revista de Antropología, vol. 14, nº 2, pp. 1-28, 2009. [20]E. Arteaga, M. San Sebastián y A. Amores, «Construcción participativa de indicadores de la implementación del modelo de salud intercultural en el cantón Loreto, Ecuador,» Saúde em Debate, vol. 36, nº 94, pp. 402-413, 2012. [21]L. Véliz Rojas, A. Bianchetti Saavedra y M. Silva Fernández, «Competencias interculturales en la atención primaria de salud: un desafío para la educación superior frente a contextos de diversidad cultural,» Cuadernos de Saúde Pública, vol. 35, nº 1, pp. 62-71, 2019. [22]C. Walsh, Interculturalidad: Estado, sociedad: luchas decoloniales de nuestra época, Quito: Abya Yala UASB, 2015. [23]E. Ortiz Prado y G. Ceballos Serra, «Marco estratégico para la protección de los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento voluntario y contacto inicial. Consultoría sobre situación de salud de los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento y contacto inicial en el Ecuador,» Organización del Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica, Quito, 2014. [24]J. Betancurt, A. Green, J. Carrillo y Anane-Firempong, «Defining Cultural competence: a practical framework for adressing racial/ethnic disparities in health and health care,» Public Health, vol. 118, nº 2, pp. 293-302, 2016. [25]R. Ceballos, A. Amores y R. Rojas, Prestación de servicios de salud en zonas con pueblos indígenas, Quito: Programa Regional de Salud de los Pueblos Indígenas, 2009. [26]L. Pereira de Melo, «A contemporaneidade da teoría do cuidado cultural de Madeleine Leininger: una perspectiva geohistórica,» Ensaios e Ciencia: ciencias biológicas, agrarias e da Saúde, vol. 14, nº 2, pp. 21-32, 2010. [27]C. Rohrbach-Viadas, «Introducción a la teoría de los cuidados culturales enfermeros de la diversidad y la universalidad de Madeleine Leininger,» Revista Cultura del cuidado, vol. 2, nº 3, pp. 32-46, 1998. [28]O. Aguilar Guzmán, I. Carrasco González, M. García Piña, A. Saldívar y R. Ostiguín Meléndez, «Madeleine Leininger: análisis de sus fundamentos teóricos,» Revista de Enfermería Universitaria, vol. 4, nº 2, pp. 26-32, 2007. (shrink)

This paper explores the thinking of some Salamancan theologians regarding the notion of pure nature. In particular, I address Suárez’s thinking on this subject and locate it within the context of the debate over whether human beings have a desire for the beatific vision. Insofar as a number of Thomists and Suárez think that there is no natural desire for a supernatural end, human beings are, by nature, left only with a desire for natural beatitude. The theoretical possibility of a (...) human nature created without any order to a supernatural end and also falling outside the economy of grace becomes a subject of speculation that serves to illuminate something about created nature itself. (shrink)

After the last very deep and intense investigations on Zubiri’s thought carried out in recent decades, this essay aims to contribute to make an assessment of the current state of the matter, examining several fundamental problems concerning human knowledge, which has been masterfully elucidated by the Spanish thinker: the question of truth and its modalities; the link between truth, knowledge and reality (the question of realism, types of scepticism and the question of hermeneutic). It is also about seeing the question (...) of the limits and possibilities from human Knowledge, attending to the articulation between human cognitive activity and the ontological structure of man (spiritual and corporeal at once). All of this is about seeing the achievements of Zubiri’s approach - placing his proposal in the context of the history of Western thought, and in particular, in the context of current thinking - emphasizing the possibilities it opens in the future, but its difficulties too. (shrink)

La humanidad ha comenzado a percibirse como una especie que podría enfrentar la extinción, y si ese será o no nuestro futuro es una cuestión que será definida por los conscientes o los dementes. Se argumenta que la principal ilusión del ser humano es seguir creyendo que somos seres inteligentes, cuando en realidad hemos estado atentando contra nuestras propias fuentes de sobrevida. Y se pregunta: ¿No hay en realidad una brecha tajante y profunda entre el ser humano dotado de esta (...) conciencia de especie y el que carece de ella? ¿No parece que se procrean en realidad dos especies dentro de un mismo gremio biológico? Postula el artículo como posibilidad optimista de futuro la conciencia de especie, una política que sea un “pacto por la vida” y una ética planetaria por la supervivencia. (shrink)

Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...) the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson. (shrink)

Los autores presentan el nuevo enfoque que busca la integración de las ciencias de la naturaleza con las ciencias sociales y humanas. Destacan el surgimiento de las disciplinas híbridas y las nuevas propuestas epistemológicas y metodológicas, exponiendo en particular el surgimiento de la sociología ambiental y el tema de lo rural como referente empírico. Analizan el metabolismo entre la sociedad y la naturaleza, relevando la apropiación de la naturaleza como eje de lo rural mostrando su carácter multidimensional. Concluyen en la (...) necesidad de estudiar lo rural desde una perspectiva multidisciplinaria señalando que la crisis del mundo moderno que se experimenta dice relación con la transgresión de los límites biofísicos del planeta. (shrink)

In this comparative study the author accounts for the interpretative bases of 2 Corinthians 13:5. The process of the study follows the following structure: A. Approaching the genesis of the work; B. Diachronic and synchronic reading of the text; C. Pragmatic reading and philosophical applications; D..

This essay explores Francisco Suárez’s account of the nature of human free will. To that end, Suárez’s engagement with John Calvin is considered so as to place the Jesuit’s account into greater relief. The conclusion of this study will reveal that, for Suárez, the human will’s freedom of self–determination is both caused by God and consists in its own indifference regarding the power to act and the power not to act.

Attachment -- Awake -- Awareness -- Actions -- Breath -- Buddha -- Chakras -- Change -- Compassion -- Control -- Conversion -- Criticism -- Divinity -- Emotions -- Empathy -- Forgiveness -- Gatha -- Generosity -- Generosity (part 2) -- Happiness -- Humility -- Identifying -- Illusions -- Judging -- Karma -- Karma (part 2) -- Kindness -- Lessons -- Loving-kindness -- Meditation -- Mind -- Namaste -- Nonattachment -- Nonharming -- Nonharming (part 2) -- Openness -- Possessions -- Practice (...) -- Quest -- Reincarnation -- Religion -- Requiring more -- Reverence -- Scripture -- Seeing -- Self -- Spirituality -- Suffering -- Teachers -- Thoughts -- Tonglen -- Transcending -- Treasure -- Tumo -- Understanding -- Virtues -- Worlds -- The mathematic symbol for the unknown -- Xenophilia -- Yoga -- Yoga (part 2) -- Yuga -- Zen. (shrink)

Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other (...) things, from the fact that ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges ground intersubjective disagreement. Once these constraints are fully in view, I go on to show that they pose a challenging dilemma for any account of the second person and that the chasm between friends and foes of the distinctness of second person thought is better seen as endorsements of one of the horns of the dilemma. In reaction to this, I outline a way of accommodating both constraints in terms of ‘perspectives’, i.e. ways of thinking of a reference that do not individuate a thought. On the recommended approach, the second person perspective is cognitively distinctive but does not itself signal the existence of a distinctive second person type of thought. By contrast, a single type of thought about selves expressible with personal indexicals—the self-thought type—can be shown to comprise the third, the second and, perhaps surprisingly, the first person perspective. Unlike other perspectival approaches, the here proposed analysis relies on an elucidation of perspectives in terms of specific information on which a thinker draws made available by a concept-individuating reference rule. (shrink)

This article explores Bonaventure’s metaphysical account of creation, which holds that at the heart of every creature is a sort of metaphysical vanity. That vanity stems from the exigencies of a creation metaphysics in which the creator-God draws every creature out of nothingness into being. But, while God’s creative act sustains the creature in being, the nothingness from which God preserves creation, on Bonaventure’s view, always remains a feature of creation’s metaphysical constitution. In short, for the Seraphic Doctor, because nothingness (...) always resides in creation, creation itself is fundamentally vain. Since vanity is a central theme in the book of Ecclesiastes, concerning which Bonaventure has left us a commentary, I argue that the metaphysical vision he employs to illuminate the nature of vanity as it pertains to creation—both within his biblical commentary and beyond—can be properly described as a “metaphysic of Ecclesiastes.”. (shrink)

Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...) prioritize agency awareness over introspective awareness of it. This point fits with an integrative account of thought insertion at the personal and mechanistic levels. Second, rational and competent uses of the first person purely based on introspection do not necessarily involve a full-fledged first-person perspective over one’s thoughts. This suggests that agency awareness, and not introspection as such, is primarily involved in determining the reference of the first person featuring in the judgments. (shrink)

Suppose you utter the sentence “I am a professional philosopher”. Can I –or anybody else – literally express the same thought you thereby expressed? An affirmative answer implies a potential split between the referent of the thought you expressed and its thinker, as well as the possibility of expressing that thought without using the first person pronoun. Here I attempt to clarify the basic features of a reference rule individuating such an intersubjectively shareable type of thought, i.e. the self type. (...) Doing so requires meeting Bermúdez’s (2019) challenge, namely, the challenge of determining (a) in virtue of what is an individual the referent but not necessarily the thinker of the thought in such cases, and (b) what makes it the case that a sentence is used to express a self type of thought, as opposed to a thought of another type. I advance an elucidation that is entirely congenial to Bermúdez’s own account in terms of location abilities. Contrary to what he suggests, however, the analysis plausibly remains one at the level of the contextually constrained type (or instantiable type), and leads to a revision – if not a straightforward rejection – of Frege’s Criterion for the individuation of thought. (shrink)

It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as (...) the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought. (shrink)

Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way w such that, for any thinker x, only x can access the first person way w of thinking about x. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within (...) an overall Fregean framework, may better explain how first person thoughts reach out into a public, shareable dimension. Here I shape this possibility in terms of perspectives, i.e. ways of thinking that do not individuate concepts or thoughts. Perspectives, I submit, can serve to unproblematically accommodate basic disagreement in indexical cases and to outline the dynamic character of first person thought. (shrink)

After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behavioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then (...) consider a case of insect sensorimotor systematic behavior: communicating behavior in honey bees. I conclude that anti-representational dynamicism fails to capture the fundamental trait of systematic behaviors qua systematic, i.e., their involving exercises of the same behavioral capacities. I suggest, finally, a collaborative strategy in pursuit of a rich and powerful account of this central phenomenon of high cognition at all levels of explanation, including the representational level. (shrink)

Concept-individuating reference rules offer a well-known route for the explanation of immunity to error through misidentification in judgments involving first person or de se thought. However, the ‘outright’ version of this account—one that sanctions a one-to-one correspondence between the reference-fixing rule and immunity—cannot do justice to the unassailable ground-relativity of the target phenomenon. In this paper, I outline a version of the reference-rule account that circumvents this problem. I state a reference rule for the de se concept that makes space (...) for different non-reference-fixing ways of thinking or perspectives, yielding different grounds for judgment. The proposal and its ramifications, I argue, shed light on the variety of ways in which this kind of immunity has been proved to be present—and indeed absent—in de se thought. (shrink)

Consider the Unshareability View, namely, the view that first person thought or self-thought—thought as typically expressed via the first person pronoun—is not shareable from subject to subject. In this article, I show that a significant number of Fregean and non-Fregean commentators of Frege have taken the Unshareability View to be the default Fregean position, rehearse Frege’s chief claims about self-thought and suggest that their combination entails the Unshareability View only on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between way (...) of thinking and thought-individuating cognitive value, outline an account of self-thought that rejects the assumption and keeps intact all of Frege’s chief claims, and respond to a number of worries to the effect that this proposal yields undesirable results from the point of view of the individuation of self-thought at the level of cognitive value. (shrink)

Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept (...) in self-ascriptions of action can be fundamentally third-personal and concern a body that is not presented as one’s own, but as an object among others. (shrink)

From Fodor and Pylyshyn’s celebrated 1988 systematicity argument in favour of a language of thought , a challenge to connectionist models arises in the form of a dilemma: either these models do not explain systematicity or they are implementations of LOT. From consideration of this challenge and of systematicity in domains other than language, defenders of connectionism have mounted a parallel systematicity argument against LOT which results in a new self-defeating dilemma, what I call here the systematicity challenge challenge : (...) either LOT does not explain nonlinguistic systematicity, or it is in no better position than its rivals to explain any systematicity, even linguistic systematicity. In this paper, first, I critically examine the SCC and some considerations that seem to support it. Second, I offer a response to the SCC by: showing that LOT was never meant to be a cognitive model restricted only to linguistic systematicity, and formulating a new argument in favour of LOT from nonlinguistic systematicity. Third, I argue that there is a central assumption underlying the SCC and maintain that it is mistaken. I conclude that the classical systematicity challenge continues to be fully valid for linguistic and nonlinguistic domains. (shrink)

One may not only represent the same objects of one’s past, but also represent them as the same objects across time. I call this phenomenon “Remembering as the Same” (RaS). In this article, I aim to bring out the connection between the simulationist model of cognitive memory and this underexplored aspect of memory experience. I shall suggest that, unlike the causalist contender, the simulationist is in an advantageous position to properly capture RaS, especially when subjects represent past objects as the (...) same in cross-temporal trains of thought that are also future-oriented. In the course of defending this claim, I will highlight the significance of RaS in the study of memory and cross-temporal reference, critically examine the resources available to causalist approaches, and reject too simplistic incorporations of RaS within the simulationist framework. (shrink)

Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our (...) pre-theoretical conceptions, I propose, instead, a strategy to circumvent this rather unexpected result: to reject subject-specific de se contents in favour of subject-specific ways of thinking that do not enter into the content of one's attitudes. (shrink)

Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and (...) suggest that acknowledgement of this level highlights two important amendments of contemporary views. First, sceptics must accept that, when explanation is attitude-involving, the attitudes mentioned in the explanation of action must refer to the agent. Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, proponents of the de se should seek for accounts of de se attitudes that are not confined to a specific agent and are, therefore, sharable across agents. (shrink)

Verdejo, Víctor_A Puzzle about Disagreement.

Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if (...) not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only the level of the instantiable type is relevant for a proper assessment of the question of whether two different subjects have the same first person thought. (shrink)

In this paper, we bring into focus the level of thought or content in the elucidation of disagreement. We set out the view that disagreement at this level involves a specific form of noncotenability, namely, noncotenability as captured by sense or intension as opposed to reference. We present the challenge that nourishes the alternative referential view and suggest, through examples, that (i) only intensional disagreement is apt to adequately accommodate basic rationality constraints on disagreement, and (ii) it can meet the (...) aforementioned challenge insofar as we discriminate between noncotenability affecting one's concepts, intensionally conceived, and noncotenability affecting merely one's particular understanding of those concepts. We conclude that intensional disagreement is our best choice for an account of disagreement at the level of thought. (shrink)

Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, which is based on possession conditions for pure thinking or mere entertaining. I argue that the alternative approach has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature and has two important merits. First, it yields a direct analysis of the normativity of mental content, which is, (...) furthermore, independent of arguably non-normative notions such as truth. Second, the approach suggests new and challenging lines of response to central non-normativist objections. (shrink)

There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at (...) will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude. (shrink)

Can a subject who expresses a belief with ‘today’ on a given day, and subsequently loses track of time, retain and re-express that belief on a future, potentially distant day? Since Kaplan’s tentative remarks on Rip Van Winkle, it has become popular to answer this question in the positive. However, a remarkably simple variation of the Rip Van Winkle story can show that this kind of view leads to a puzzling dilemma: either subjects cannot re-express a belief with utterances of (...) ‘today’ on the same day, or else they may rationally exhibit conflicting stances toward the same ‘today’-belief. This result may be seen as supporting the claim that retention of ‘today’-belief over time requires the tracking of days. Yet it may also spur further research into the capacities involved in belief retention and re-expression to solve the puzzle. (shrink)

This article examines Richard Lynch’s metaphysics and finds that he ultimately resolves his account of being in terms of essens—that which denotes the essential structure that a being (ens) has apart from existence. For Lynch, unlike many of his Jesuit contemporaries, existence is accidental to being. Yet, even if essens is distinct from existence, it is not altogether lacking being, but is accorded a certain kind of “essential being,” which is identified with the possible. Lynch thus seems to re-appropriate an (...) essentialist metaphysics that has antecedents in Avicenna and Henry of Ghent’s notion of esse essentiae. More proximate to Lynch is the Jesuit thinker Francesco Albertini, who takes Henry’s metaphysics and conveys it to Baroque Scholasticism. Lynch continues down that metaphysical path which, as we shall see, generated fierce controversy among late seventeenth-century Scholastics regarding the nature of creaturely possibility. (shrink)

This book examines the thought of scholasticism’s Doctor eximius in its entirety: both philosophically and theologically. Many of the most distinctive features of Suárez’s thought are identified and evaluated in light of his immediate historical context. What emerges from the studies contained in this volume is the picture of a thinker who is profoundly steeped in the riches of divergent schools of thought and yet who manages to find his own unique voice to add to the chorus of scholasticism.